I. PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS AND REMARKS
1. Necessity Circumscribed 1
2. Modality de dicto and Modality de re 9

II. MODALITY DE RE: OBJECTIONS
1. The Problem 14
2. Essentialism and Set Theoretical Reduction 16
3. Essentialism and the Number of Apostles 18
4. Essentialism and the Mathematical Cyclist 23

III. MODALITY DE RE: EXPLANATIONS
1. The Locus of Necessity 27
2. The Kernel Function 29
3. Some Objections 32
A. The Kernel Function and Kripke Semantics 33
B. Identity and The Kernel Function 34
c. Circularity and the Kernel Function 36

IV. WORLDS, BOOKS, AND ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES
1. Worlds 44
2. Books 45
3. Existence and Properties in a World 46
4. Actuality 48
5. This World and the Actual World 49
6. Relative Possibility 51
7. Truth and Truth-in-a 55
8. Necessary Truth and Essential Properties 55
9. Some Putative Principles 57
10. What Properties are Essential to Socrates? 60
11. World-indexed Properties 62
12. Could Socrates have been an Alligator? 65

V. THE NECESSITY OF NATURES
1. Essence Preliminarily Characterized 70
2. The Nature of Essence 72
3. Essences and Proper Names 77
4. Hesperus and Phosphorus 81

VI. TRANSWORLD IDENTITY OR WORLDBOUND INDIVIDUALS?
1. The Question 88
2. Socrates in at and Socrates in W 89
3. The Problem of Transworld Identity 92
A. The Problem Stated 92
B. A Temporal Analogy 94
c. The Problem Resolved 96
D. Essence and Transworld Identity 97
E. Does Ramsification Destroy Information? 99
4. Objections to TWI 10
5. Counterpart Theory
6. Semantic Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory
A. Socrates and Xenophon
B. Socrates and Socrates-identity
7. Metaphysical Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory

VII. POSSIBLE BUT UNACTUAL OBJECTS: THE
CLASSICAL ARGUMENT
1. The Question
2. Modal Logic and Possible Objects
3. How Shall we Take the Semantics?
4. Pure and Applied Semantics
5. Applied Semantics and Possible Objects
6. Are There Nonexistent Objects?
7. The Classical Argument
8. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Russell
9. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Searle
10. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: the Historical Chain
View
11. Some Varieties of Singular Existentials

VII. POSSIBLE BUT UNACTUAL OBJECTS: ON WHAT THERE ISN’T
1. Predicative and Impredicative Singular Propositions
2. The Classical Argument Fails
3. Creatures of Fiction
4. Names: Their Function in Fiction

IX. GOD, EVIL, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF FREEDOM
1. The Problem 164
2. The Free Will Defence 165
3. The Objection 167
4. Which Worlds Could God Have Created? 169
5. Counterfactuals 174
6. Leibniz’s Lapse 180
7. Transworld Depravity 184
8. The Free Will Defence Triumphant 189
9. God’s Existence and the Amount of Moral Evil 190
10. God’s Existence and Natural Evil 191
11. The Probabilistic Argument from Evil 193

X. GOD AND NECESSITY
1. The Anselmian Statement 197
2. The Argument Restated 198
3. The Argument Examined 202
4. A Mistaken Modal Version 205
5. The Argument Without Possible Objects 209
6. The Hartshorne-Malcolm Version 212
7. A Victorious Modal Version 213
8. Final Objections and Reflections 217

APPENDIX: Quine’s Objection to Quantified Modal Logic
1. The Objection Initially Stated 222
2. Sizeability is not a Property 224
3. The Objection Restated 228
4. The Objection Examined 229
A. The Hintikka Response 231
B. The Smullyan Reply 232
5. Proper Terms and Aristotelian Essentialism 233
6. Modal Logic and Essentialism 235
7. Quine’s Charge and Professor Marcus 238
8. Quine’s Charge and Professor Parsons 243
9. Essentialism and Applied Semantics 248