1. Introduction, 1 The soul, 1 Some conceptions of the soul, 2 The soul and the mind, 2 The mind, 3 The varieties of mental phenomena, 4 The relation of philosophy of mind to other disciplines, 7 What is con¬sciousness?, 8 Some theories of mental phenomena, 11.

2. Consciousness, 14 The third-person account, 14 The merit of the third-person account, 17 Some difficulties in the third-person account, 19 The first-person account, 21 The thesis of intentionality, 22 The private ostensive definition, 24 An objection, 25 A compromise solution, 28

3. Tho Subject of Dualism, 35 The traditional mind-body problem, 37 Objections to dualism, 38 Materialism, 39 Some difficulties in the identity theory, 44 A double aspect account, 50 The person theory, 52 What is a person?, 55 A reconsideration of dualism, 58

4. Consciousness sand the Body, 60 Dualistic theories, 61 Parallelism, 62 Epiphenomenalism, 68 The paradox of epiphenomenalism, 69 Psychophysical interactionism, 71 An afterlife?, 72 Parapsychological phenomena, 74

5. Actions, 77
Some theories of actions, 80 (1) Mental events as the causes of action, 81. (2) The theory of agency, 85 (3) A performative theory, 88 (4) Goals as the explanation of actions, 91 (5) Contextual accounts of actions, 94 Reasons and causes, 97 The mental cause theory revisited, 104 The problem of free will, 106

For Further Reading, 111

Index, 115

This book is very much the product of twelve fruitful and happy years at Swarthmore College. Much of the material in it has been tested (and often found wanting) by the Swarthmore students, who taught me more than I ever taught them. I am much indebted to long discussions over the years with my Swarthmore colleagues, who have included Richard Brandt, Monroe Beardsley, Michael Scriven, Jaegwon Kim, Charles Raff, Hans Oberdiek, Richard Schuld- enfrei, and neighboring Charles Dyke and Elizabeth Beardsley. To the editors of this series, I owe a special debt for their very helpful suggestions, unfailing tact, and remarkable ability to refrain from ever asking, despite countless opportunities, how the book was coming along. For secretarial help, I am grateful to Mrs. Mary Renneisen, Mrs. Dodie Halliwell, and, above all, Mrs. Edith Cohen. I now look to my new colleagues at the University of Connecticut to help me write a better book.
I wish to thank my parents, who brought me to consciousness, and my children, Diana and David, who gave me an object lesson in the miracle of consciousness. My wife, Olivia, has been a constant source of inspiration and confidence.